Trade-offs between Epistemic and Moral Values in Evidence-Based Policy by Khosrowi, Donal
	   1	  
Trade-offs between Epistemic and Moral Values in Evidence-Based Policy 
 
Donal Khosrowi 
Durham University 
30 October 2016 
 
 
 
Abstract: I examine the role and relationship of epistemic and moral values in the Evidence-
Based Policy (EBP) paradigm. I argue that several epistemic values that play a crucial role in 
shaping standard EBP methodology stand in a trade-off relation with certain kinds of moral and 
political values. This is because the outputs afforded by standard EBP methods are insufficient for 
the pursuit of moral and political values that require information about the distribution of 
individual treatment-effects among agents in a population. I examine a potential reply to this 
standard concern, and argue that the changes to standard EBP methodology required for rendering 
research outputs informative about the distributive consequences of policy typically involve the 
sacrifice of several key EBP epistemic values at once. I expand on the implications of this trade-
off for value-freedom and -neutrality in EBP. 
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1. Introduction 
Evidence-based policy (EBP) is the call that public policy formation should be informed 
by high-quality empirical evidence for policy effectiveness from randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs) and meta-analyses. In emphasizing the superior epistemic credentials of these 
methods, EBP advocates seek promote several epistemic values such as rigor, 
unbiasedness, precision and the ability to obtain causal conclusions about policy 
effectiveness.  
In what follows I argue that these epistemic values stand in a trade-off relation with a wide 
range of moral values that policy-makers may be interested in pursuing. Specifically, I 
argue that standard EBP methodology severely complicates policy makers’ ability to 
pursue moral values such as equality or priority for the worst-off. This is because standard 
EBP methods are not informative about the distributive consequences of policy (see e.g. 
Manski 2000). This is a substantive shortcoming, particularly when we have reasons to 
suspect that a policy will render some agents worse off. Yet, since the evidence typically 
afforded by EBP methods is uninformative on such distributive consequences, it is 
differentially useful for the pursuit of different moral and political values, specifically 
utilitarian vs. non-utilitarian values. I argue that this challenges both value-freedom and 
neutrality in EBP.  
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The contents are organized as follows. In Section 2 I offer a sketch of the epistemic values 
involved in EBP as well as whether and how EBP involves ideals of value-freedom and 
neutrality. In Section 3 I expand on the epistemic challenges that standard EBP 
methodology faces with respect to generating information about the distributive 
consequences of policy from RCTs. I discuss how this problem can be addressed by 
performing subgroup analyses and expand on some of the challenges that this method 
faces. I also comment briefly on the extent to which these issues have been anticipated and 
addressed in the extant EBP literature. In Section 4 I give my argument for the trade-off 
relation between basic EBP epistemic values and moral values that are sensitive to the 
distributive consequences of policy. I expand on how this trade-off challenges both value-
freedom and neutrality in the EBP paradigm. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Epistemic Values in EBP 
Before I sketch the central epistemic values in the EBP paradigm and how they relate to 
EBP methodology, it is important to note that there is perhaps no univocally accepted set 
of epistemic values common to all activities under the EBP heading. More fundamentally, 
it may be contested whether there is something like a unified EBP paradigm at all. The 
EBP movement, particularly as it changes over time and in response to various criticisms, 
is difficult to precisely demarcate as a unified paradigm with distinctive and invariant 
objectives, methods, underlying epistemic value presuppositions and so forth.1  
Even so, it is not entirely misleading to think that there is a kernel of epistemic values that 
are common to a broad variety of activities under the EBP heading. It is this kernel of 
values that I focus on. These values are not coextensive with traditional epistemic values in 
the context of theory choice or appraisal such as those offered by Kuhn (1977). Instead, for 
empirical paradigms such as EBP it seems more plausible to consider values that concern 
the production of treatment-effect estimates. More specifically, the values that I focus on 
are rigor, unbiasedness, precision and the ability to obtain causal conclusions on grounds 
of EBP evidence. I consider these values to be prima facie uncontroversial instances of 
purely epistemic values that seem to be shared among many EBP practitioners. While it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In addition to this caveat, it is important to note that the construal of Evidence-Based Policy I 
consider here is somewhat constrained in that it prevalently focuses on the so-called treatment-
effects literature as instantiated in e.g. econometrics and evidence-based economics, evidence-
based medicine and educational research. The distinctive characteristic of this literature is its 
predominant focus on experimental and quasi-experimental methods to estimate treatment 
effectiveness. This is considerably narrower than a construal of evidence-based policy as policy 
that is informed by any empirical evidence rather than only specific kinds of such evidence. I thank 
Erin Nash for raising this important point about the scope of Evidence-Based Policy. 
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not always clear what these values specifically consist in, my argument is sufficiently 
broad to cover most plausible construals that they permit.2 
The values that I focus on are central to EBP in the sense that they jointly give rise to (and 
are promoted by) standard EBP methodology, i.e. a set of salient methodological principles 
that seem to be shared among proponents of the paradigm.  
For instance, EBP methodology specifically focuses on certain epistemic targets, i.e. causal 
conclusions about policy effectiveness. Moreover, EBP methodology is premised on 
principles concerning the relative desirability of certain kinds of evidence, e.g. by 
emphasis of the superiority of experimental and quasi-experimental contra purely 
observational evidence. Finally, EBP methodology emphasizes the relative ability of 
different methods with respect to generating desirable kinds of evidence; again by focusing 
on RCTs (and quasi-experimental designs) as opposed to observational studies. 
Together, these methodological principles mediate between epistemic values and methods 
in the sense that EBP methodology promotes values such as rigor, unbiasedness and causal 
inference in virtue of recommending the use of RCTs. 
 
2.1 Value Neutrality and Freedom in EBP  
Aside from the identification of crucial EBP epistemic values, it is important to consider 
whether EBP involves some ideal of value-freedom and/or neutrality. Similar to the issue 
of identifying key EBP epistemic values, it is not obvious that EBP proponents in general 
pursue any specific ideal with respect to value-freedom and neutrality.  
Even so, it seems that the EBP paradigm rests on a relatively broad axiological 
presupposition that a division of labor with regard to settling normative issues of what 
values policy should promote and settling factual issues of what are effective means to 
promote these values is possible. In other words, EBP proponents seem to assume that 
agreement on the desirability of policy outcomes can be separated from the production of 
evidence speaking for the efficacy and effectiveness of policy in realizing these outcomes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  There may be several additional candidate epistemic values that appear to play prominent roles in 
shaping EBP research but are not considered here. One such candidate is generality, where the 
principled aim is to establish general claims about the causal efficacy of intervention-types that are 
robust across time, environments, populations, and individuals. This value seems particularly 
relevant for extrapolation of causal claims to novel targets; an issue that is related to, but 
epistemologically distinct, from the issue of welfare analysis of extant interventions that I focus on. 
I thank Heather Douglas for proposing this additional candidate value at the “Science, Values and 
Democracy” workshop in Tilburg, NL.  
	   4	  
This broadly parallels traditional ideals regarding the role of non-epistemic, moral values 
in economics, where economists have frequently invoked the metaphor of economists as 
social engineers, who provide factual answers to policy questions independently from and 
typically after policy makers have settled issues concerning the relative desirability of 
social outcomes (cf. Hausman and McPherson 1996). While I am not claiming that EBP 
proponents subscribe to this particular ideal, EBP methodology seems to presuppose at 
least that some such division of labor is possible. Let me expand on what this suggests for 
the role of value-freedom and neutrality in EBP.  
First, it seems plausible that many EBP proponents pursue some ideal of value-freedom in 
the sense that non-epistemic values are generally not and should not be involved in shaping 
the conduct and outcomes of EBP research internally. For instance, while non-epistemic 
values may be involved in selecting outcome variables of interest, or may act as constraints 
on whether conducting RCTs is morally permissible, non-epistemic values are generally 
not and should not be involved in the choice and application of methods once these issues 
are settled. For instance, the choice between RCTs and observational studies, or the 
interpretation of estimands obtained from such studies, should not vary with respect to 
researchers’ preferred conclusions about the desirability of the policies under scrutiny. 
These internal aspects should be guided by epistemic values alone.  
Second, I consider EBP proponents to pursue some version of value-neutrality in the sense 
that the outcomes of EBP research are intended to be value-neutral insofar as they should 
not, and generally do not issue unconditional normative claims about the relative 
desirability of social outcomes or the interventions that promote them. At most, if there are 
normative claims issued in the dissemination of EBP research, these claims take the shape 
of hypothetical imperatives, i.e. normative claims that are conditional on some substantive 
value presupposition but do not endorse this value presupposition as such. 
In order for EBP research to maintain value-neutral, the adequacy of such presuppositions 
speaking for the desirability of some social outcome must be settled independently from 
(and perhaps prior to) generating information about the relative effectiveness of different 
interventions in producing the outcome. If such independence is achieved, then even if 
EBP research sometimes issues normative claims, these claims are still value-neutral since 
they remain non-committal on the adequacy of the substantive moral value presuppositions 
involved. This issue is left to policy-makers to settle. 
With this brief exposition in mind, let me focus on the underlying reasons for why the 
epistemic challenges involved in generating information about the distributive 
consequences of policy yield a trade-off between the epistemic values outlined above and 
non-epistemic values such as equality and priority for the worst-off.  
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3. Treatment Effect Heterogeneity 
Public policy interventions almost invariably affect agents in heterogeneous ways. 
Consider for instance the case of microfinance programs, i.e. programs that supply 
microcredits to agents who lack access to capital markets. Let us grant for the moment that 
at least some of these programs may be successful in generating positive long-run welfare 
consequences for target populations, e.g. by increasing average household endowment or 
private investment. Even so, behavioral response to microfinance access often differs 
significantly between agents (cf. Banerjee et al. 2015)3. Some agents, e.g. those whose 
otherwise successful entrepreneurial efforts are inhibited by inadequate access to capital 
markets, may significantly benefit from such programs. Yet, other, economically less 
sophisticated agents may be driven into debt traps by pursuing unprofitable business plans 
and taking up high-interest loans in order to repay initial program loans. 
Such heterogeneity in individual treatment effects is predominantly attributable to 
differences in the causal mechanisms involved in the production of the outcomes of 
interest or the individual-specific realizations of variables that figure in these mechanisms. 
This means that the mechanisms connecting treatment and outcome variables of interest 
typically involve various factors other than treatment that affect the causal relations 
between treatment and outcome in different ways. For instance, the mechanisms that 
causally relate microfinance access and eventual welfare consequences for target agents 
are plausibly mediated and moderated by an extensive battery of factors such as 
entrepreneurial ability, education, prior business ownership, pre-intervention budget 
constraints, business plan feasibility etc. These and other factors jointly moderate or 
mediate the causal effect of treatment on outcome, and agents will typically differ with 
respect to their individual-specific realizations of these factors as well as whether and how 
these factors are involved in the individual-specific mechanism that govern the production 
of the outcomes of interest. As a consequence of such differences, individual treatment 
effects with respect to one and the same intervention will typically differ between 
individuals. 
This kind of causally relevant heterogeneity is likely to obtain in many areas traditionally 
targeted by EBP, e.g. in educational policy, where students may respond differentially to 
educational initiatives as a function of initial ability; in economic policy where policy 
outcomes may differ significantly between industries, individual firms and other agential 
units; and in public health and development economics, where agents’ response to 
programs such as bednet distribution might exhibit substantial heterogeneity as a function 
of agents’ basic needs or epidemiological knowledge. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Cited with permission from the authors 
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As these stylized facts indicate, heterogeneity among agents’ response to treatment is 
ubiquitous in several key areas targeted by EBP. Yet, the issue of heterogeneity has only 
recently attracted attention from EBP proponents (in marked contrast to evidence-based 
medicine, see e.g. Oxman and Guyatt 1992 for an early treatment). This is surprising 
because heterogeneity is responsible for one of the most basic inferential challenges that 
EBP faces, i.e. the problem of extrapolating experimental results from study populations to 
eventual policy targets. Let me expand on some technical background to explain why this 
is the case. 
 
3.1 Heterogeneity Information from RCTs 
Technically, treatment effect heterogeneity is the systematic variation in the sign and/or 
magnitude of individual treatment effects among agents subject to a given intervention. In 
a potential outcomes framework (Rubin 1974, Holland 1986), given an outcome of interest 𝑌, the individual treatment effect (ITE) for individual 𝑖 is the difference between her 
potential outcome 𝑌!(1) given the treatment and her potential outcome 𝑌!(0) in the absence 
of treatment, other things being equal. Since only one of the two values of 𝑌! can ever be 
observed, ITEs are in principle unobservable magnitudes.  
RCTs can be considered to remedy this inferential dead-end at least to some extent by 
permitting the estimation of average treatment effects (ATEs) instead of ITEs. This is 
achieved by randomization of confounding factors and treatment moderators and 
mediators4 through random assignment of subjects to experimental and control conditions 
and multiple blinding of trial participants, those administering treatment and those 
recording and interpreting outcomes. Provided that randomization (and blinding) are 
successful in that the net effects of confounders and moderators (as well as their 
interactions) are approximately balanced between treatment and control groups, an ideal 
RCT can help obtain a consistent estimate of the ATE by taking the difference in means of 𝑌 for treated and untreated units, or 𝐴𝑇𝐸 =   𝑌! 1 − 𝑌!(0). 
This estimate of the ATE, however, does not permit inferences about ITEs. At best, and in 
the absence of any knowledge about treatment effect covariates such as moderators and 
mediators as well as heterogeneity in their individual-specific realizations, the ATE 
estimate can figure as the expectation of the ITE for an individual randomly drawn from 
the experimental population. But as soon as there is (suspected) heterogeneity among 
treatment-effect covariate realizations and consequently ITEs, this estimate will not be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The distinction between confounders and moderators/mediators being that confounders influence 
the outcome variable independently of treatment whereas moderators/mediators influence the 
outcome by affecting the causal pathway(s) connecting treatment and outcome.	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precise, so accurate inferences about ITEs are largely precluded and information on 
heterogeneity cannot be recovered from 𝐴𝑇𝐸. 5 
This has significant bearing on the transferability of trial results, i.e. the extent to which 
the ATE from a study population A can be expected to be replicated in some other 
population B. Two jointly sufficient conditions for the transferability of trial results to 
some out-of-sample target are first, that the treatment variable plays the same causal role in 
the production of the outcome in the target as it does in the experimental population, i.e. 
that the mechanisms in both populations are sufficiently similar with respect to the causal 
claim to be extrapolated. The second condition is that the distribution of treatment effect 
covariates in the target is the same in both populations (see e.g. Cartwright and Marcellesi 
2015 for similar conditions).6 So the transferability of experimental results to targets 
hinges not only on sufficient similarity in mechanisms between populations but also on 
whether there is heterogeneity effected by differences in treatment-effect covariates as well 
as how such covariates such as moderators and mediators are distributed among agents in 
the populations of interest. This problem has received attention from a variety of 
econometricians, methodologists, philosophers of science and EBP proponents (e.g. Hotz-
Imbens and Mortimer 2005, Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer 2008; Imbens and Wooldridge 
2009; Bareinboim and Pearl 2013; Cartwright and Marcellesi 2015).  
However, heterogeneity does not only affect the transferability of trial results. It also 
creates a second challenge for EBP. The challenge is that in the absence of information on 
heterogeneity, RCTs are not suitable for informing any policy formation process that is 
concerned with the distributive consequences of policy (cf. Manski 2000). More 
specifically, policy-makers are often interested in knowing not only whether an 
intervention is effective on average but also in how effective the intervention will be for 
specific types of agents, how heterogeneous treatment effects are distributed among agents, 
with respect to which observable baseline characteristics, whether heterogeneity obtains in 
magnitude or also in sign, etc.  
This information is crucial particularly in those cases where it is reasonable to suspect that 
at least some agents may respond negatively to an intervention, even though the ATE 
might be positive. In these scenarios, several pertinent distributive concerns arise, e.g. is it 
at all permissible to implement policy that will render some agents worse off? If so, how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 	  While this difference-in-means estimation yields, without strong assumptions, an unbiased 
estimate of the sample ATE, and under somewhat stronger assumptions of the population ATE, it 
takes substantive assumptions about distributions of ITEs to estimate even the sample variance of 
the ATE (although this estimate can be bounded by inspection of the treatment and control mean 
variances).	  	  
6 Necessary conditions might be weaker, cf. Bareinboim and Pearl (2013) 
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should we adjudicate between the negative welfare consequences for these agents and the 
net effectiveness of the intervention? What are the thresholds of proportionality that we 
should use to decide whether welfare benefits on the part of some outweigh welfare losses 
on the part of others? Can the policy be targeted so that it predominantly affects those who 
will benefit from the intervention? And so forth.  
As these stylized concerns suggest, policy-makers may be interested in pursuing a variety 
of different distributive values. Yet, in order to pursue these values rigorously, in the sense 
that they have good reasons to believe that an intervention will promote them, policy-
makers require information on treatment effect heterogeneity, i.e. whether there is 
heterogeneity at all and how heterogeneous treatment effects are distributed with respect to 
agents’ observable characteristics. As I have argued above, RCTs do not provide such 
information on their own.  
Yet, this does not mean that EBP methodology is at a complete loss in this regard, as EBP 
proponents may be keen to point out that one way to address this problem is to perform so-
called subgroup analyses. However, I argue below that performing such analyses comes at 
the expense of sacrificing several key EBP epistemic values and that this creates a tradeoff 
between the epistemic values central to EBP and the pursuit of moral and political values 
such as equality and priority for the worst off. 
 
3.2 Subgroup Analysis as a Remedy for Informing about Heterogeneity 
Following Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer (2008), subgroup analyses partition 
experimental populations into subgroups according to observable characteristics such as 
age, sex, ethnicity, prior education etc. They then typically further partition subgroups into 
different categories or strata, for instance age groups. Given this stratification, a difference-
in-means estimation can be run on the partitioned data to obtain conditional, subgroup-
specific ATEs (CATEs). An alternative to this stratification approach that is applied 
predominantly when investigating binary and categorical variables, is to run so-called 
meta-regressions, where potentially interesting treatment-effect covariates are modeled as 
interaction terms with treatment in a standard regression framework. In doing so, it is 
possible to obtain information on significant interaction effects between observables and 
treatment that may be taken as evidence for the involvement of the respective treatment 
effect covariates as moderators or mediators. 
Even so, while subgroup analyses seem to offer at least tentative information about 
heterogeneity, they are also subject to several pertinent methodological concerns. Let me 
expand on two particularly pressing concerns and explain how they bear on the realization 
of EBP epistemic values. 
	   9	  
First, the information that meta-regressions can generate is purely correlational in nature, 
and hence subject to standard concerns about endogeneity and consequent bias. For 
instance, statistically significant parameter estimates on treatment effect heterogeneity of 
microfinance programs with respect to differences in prior business ownership do not 
permit the straightforward interpretation that prior business ownership is a causally 
relevant treatment effect covariate.  
This is because the significance of the estimate may be attributable to common-causes, e.g. 
because business ownership is highly correlated with business education, and it is business 
education that is causally relevant for the production of microfinance outcomes, but prior 
business ownership in the absence of business education may not contribute at all to 
outcomes of interest.7 In this case, if business education is not included in the regression, 
our estimates of individual-level heterogeneity with respect to prior business ownership 
will be biased.  
More generally, parameter estimates for treatment effect covariates will invariably remain 
subject to such concerns about bias unless we can entertain the relatively strong 
assumption that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term of the meta-regression 
(see e.g. Pearl 2014). However, it is precisely such assumptions, which are necessary for 
unbiased identification in regression contexts, that EBP proponents are typically keen to 
avoid and that are expressly dismissed in the methodological tenets that emphasize 
randomization as the key strategy to avoid questionable identification assumptions. 
Randomization at the treatment stage does not alleviate these concerns either, because 
treatment effect moderators are not necessarily randomly distributed among agents who, 
with respect to one subgroup characteristic, may systematically differ on several other 
relevant and collinear or interacted covariates at once. This means that obtaining unbiased 
estimates and straightforward causal conclusions about the role of covariates as treatment 
moderators is typically precluded, threatening at least two EBP epistemic values at once. 
A second worry about subgroup analyses concerns the precision of effect estimates and 
statistical power. In short, the more subgroups one specifies, the higher the probability of 
obtaining spurious results. For typical significance levels at 𝑝   <   0.05  even a moderate 
number of subgroups, strata partitions and corresponding hypothesis tests will render the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For instance, prior business ownership in the absence of business education can be exhibited by 
agents who have previously pursued unprofitable business plans and may continue to do so in the 
future. Thus the unbiased parameter estimate for business ownership is likely to be substantially 
smaller than the estimate for business education. To permit unbiased estimation of interaction 
terms, one would at least need to induce additional exogenous variation in the covariates of 
interest. But this would require significantly different trials designs with multiple, parallel 
interventions on treatment as well as covariate realizations (see e.g. Imai et al. 2013). While such 
designs are in principle feasible, they also raise issues with precision and statistical power. 
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occurrence of spurious results exceedingly likely. At the very least, suitable statistical 
corrections for multiple hypothesis testing are in order to remedy the consequences of 
multiple testing for the prevalence of false positives. Yet, while recommended by some 
EBP proponents (e.g. Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer 2008, 65), this is rarely carried out in 
practice (cf. Fink et al. 2014, 47). Moreover, to alleviate concerns about insufficient 
statistical power and precision, sample sizes may need to be expanded for subgroup 
analyses to be sufficiently informative. For instance, in order to detect a heterogeneity 
signal of the same magnitude as the ATE and with the same precision as the ATE estimate, 
a difference-in-means estimation on just one subgroup partitioned into two strata requires a 
fourfold expansion of the original sample size (Varadhan and Seeger 2013, 38). Yet, 
subgroup-specific effects are often significantly smaller than ATEs, which requires much 
greater expansions of sample size to maintain sufficient power.  
These and other, related concerns severely limit the extent to which subgroup analyses can 
inform about treatment effect heterogeneity. At most, and in line with standard 
recommendations (e.g. Varadhan and Seeger 2013), subgroup findings should be 
considered exploratory in the sense that they may prompt additional investigations such as 
novel trials on subgroups of interest, but are insufficient to warrant definitive conclusions 
about heterogeneity by themselves.  
However, while conducting novel trials on potentially vulnerable subgroups appears to be 
a viable strategy to address some of the above concerns, this requires prior identification of 
the relevant subgroups. Unfortunately, we are rarely in the epistemically fortunate position 
to know which individuals are most likely to incur welfare losses in advance, since that 
depends on knowing what the causally relevant treatment effect covariates are, how they 
affect the outcomes of interest as well as which agents exhibit beneficial vs. harmful 
realizations of such covariates. So precise information on heterogeneity is still required 
even if we are willing to conduct subsequent trials on vulnerable subgroups. 
The extant EBP literature has only recently started to address treatment effect 
heterogeneity issues. Yet, even though there are several recent social policy and 
development studies that perform at least tentative and exploratory heterogeneity analyses, 
they frequently fail to address one or more of the concerns outlined above (see e.g. Fink et 
al. 2014) or tend to focus on between-trial heterogeneity, which is a related but 
conceptually distinct issue from the within-trial and between-subject heterogeneity that I 
consider here. 
Let me expand on how these epistemic challenges for informing about heterogeneity create 
a trade-off between epistemic and moral values and how this trade-off challenges both 
value-freedom and neutrality in EBP.  
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4. A Trade-off Between Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values 
The trade-off between epistemic and non-epistemic values that I want to highlight is a 
result of the differential usefulness of EBP research outcomes for the pursuit of different 
kinds of moral values, i.e. broadly utilitarian and non-utilitarian values respectively. 
Standard EBP methods such as RCTs, Regression Discontinuity Designs and IV 
identification strategies are in general capable of generating outputs that are sufficient for 
the pursuit of standard utilitarian values, i.e. those that are concerned with the increase or 
maximization of aggregate or average welfare. This is because the distribution of 
individual-specific contributions to aggregate welfare outcomes is not a primary concern 
for increasing aggregate or average welfare, so information on heterogeneity is not 
necessary for the pursuit of these values.8 
Yet, such information on heterogeneity is necessary for the pursuit of any moral and 
political value that is sensitive to how aggregate outcomes are realized. For instance, the 
pursuit of broadly egalitarian or prioritarian values requires at least information on the 
initial distribution of welfare among agents as well as information on the changes to this 
distribution brought about by the intervention at issue. Yet, as I have argued above, such 
information on treatment effect heterogeneity cannot be provided by RCTs alone. At the 
very least, subgroup analyses need to be carried out in order to permit at least tentative 
conclusions about heterogeneity. Moreover, methods such as Causal Bayes Net Analysis, 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Process Tracing and Machine Learning may present 
potentially superior alternatives for the identification of causally relevant treatment effect 
covariates that generate heterogeneity. However, such techniques are rarely acknowledged 
or mentioned in the standard manuals circulating in the EBP literature (e.g. Angrist and 
Pischke 2009), and even if they were, these methods are often neither straightforwardly 
compatible with the identification strategies that EBP practitioners typically pursue nor 
with the evidence ranking schemes that EBP methodologists subscribe to. 
This licenses two conclusions. First, EBP methodology presently favors the production and 
use of evidence suitable for the pursuit of utilitarian values, i.e. those that focus on 
increasing or maximizing average or aggregate welfare. Second, EBP methodology 
presently fails to adequately promote or even hinders the production of high-quality 
evidence on heterogeneity that is necessary for the pursuit of many non-utilitarian values. 
As a consequence, standard EBP methodology renders the pursuit of distributive values 
such as egalitarian or prioritarian ones relatively more difficult or infeasible. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It might still be helpful, since welfare maximization is easier to accomplish when we have 
information that helps pick out those individuals who will likely benefit most from some 
intervention; granted that interventions can be targeted to affect only such individuals. 
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This generates a trade-off between the epistemic values central to EBP and the moral and 
political values that policy-makers are in a position to pursue effectively on grounds of 
EBP evidence. More specifically, whenever the pursuit of moral and political values 
requires information on distributive consequences of policy, standard EBP evidence fails 
to provide the required information. Conversely, whenever evidence of the kind required to 
inform about distributive consequences of policy shall be produced, this requires at least 
some sacrifice of basic EBP epistemic values. More specifically, whenever EBP 
methodology and methods are changed in order to generate information on heterogeneity, 
e.g. by means of subgroup analyses, this comes at the expense of sacrificing at least three 
crucial EBP epistemic values at once, i.e. the unbiasedness and precision of effect 
estimates, as well as the ability to obtain causal conclusions. Maintaining these values, on 
the other hand, comes at the expense of sacrificing the informativeness of EBP research 
outputs about the distributive consequences of policy.9 
Let me expand on what this trade-off implies for value-freedom and neutrality in EBP. 
First, if the value-free ideal underlying the EBP paradigm is to say that non-epistemic 
values are generally not and should not be involved in shaping the conduct and outcomes 
of EBP research internally, then the desirability of this ideal is challenged. The reason is 
that moral and political values are at least involved to the extent that without suitable 
changes to EBP methodology, the pursuit of non-utilitarian values is inhibited. If this 
situation should be remedied, then this requires changes to methodology that privilege or 
prioritize the production of evidence on heterogeneity. However, and this is the crucial 
point, these changes will be effected by moral values, since it is the pursuit of moral values 
that motivates the requisite changes to methodology. To the extent that these changes to 
methodology are justifiable and justified, this means that value-freedom in EBP is not a 
desirable ideal, even at internal stages such as method choice and model specification.  
Value-neutrality is challenged as well. It assumes that once the desirability of some social 
outcome is agreed upon, evidence speaking in favor of the effectiveness of some 
intervention in realizing this outcome at most figures in conditionally normative policy 
recommendations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This point may appear similar to Helen Longino’s who argues that several traditional epistemic 
values are not purely epistemic and “[…] that their use in certain contexts of scientific judgment 
imports significant socio-political values into those contexts” (Longino 1996:54). However, my 
point is weaker than Longino’s in the sense that it should appeal even to those who insist on the 
purely epistemic character of values such as unbiasedness, precision, and the ability to obtain 
causal conclusions. Specifically, I do not argue that these values fail to be purely epistemic as they 
exhibit a demonstrably political (or moral) valence (ibid.). Instead, even if we grant that these 
values are purely epistemic, their pursuit may still have important ramifications for the extent to 
which the pursuit of other, moral values is facilitated or inhibited. 
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Yet, inferences about policy effectiveness are typically grounded in information about 
ATEs and as such do not accommodate information on distributive consequences. So this 
way of operationalizing what it means for a program to be effective brackets concerns 
about heterogeneity. As it stands, an effective program is considered a good program to the 
extent that the outcome of interest tracks a relevant moral or societal good. However, even 
if this good is uncontroversial in itself, effectiveness still only means effectiveness on 
average, not some effectiveness for everyone, or sufficient effectiveness for the worst-off, 
or equal effectiveness for all policy subjects.  
To maintain neutrality with respect to distributive values it is not enough to agree on the 
desirability of social outcomes as such. It is also necessary to agree upon the ways in which 
these outcomes may be realized, since a given change in aggregate outcomes can usually 
be achieved in various ways, each of which may have dramatically different distributive 
consequences for target populations, some of which may be more or less desirable in 
themselves. This issue is masked when broadly utilitarian values are pursued, but becomes 
apparent when distributive consequences matter; as is the case for the pursuit of egalitarian 
and prioritarian values. So if we care about differences between agents and about absolute 
and relative changes in outcome distributions, then effectiveness as standardly construed in 
EBP is not informative about the moral permissibility or desirability of policy and might 
be misleading about what effective programs are ultimately able to do for us, given the 
specific moral and political values that we pursue. 
So at present, it seems that the dissemination of EBP research is premised on the implicit 
value presupposition that the relevant magnitude for deciding which policy to implement is 
its effectiveness in terms of average treatment effects. And this fails to be value neutral in 
the envisioned sense because it assumes that average effectiveness is the proper target of 
interest rather than delegating the question of whether it is, to policy makers and other 
agents to settle. In a nutshell, in order to maintain a traditional ideal of value-neutrality, 
additional value presuppositions such as the above must be made explicit for EBP policy 
recommendations to remain value-neutral in the envisioned sense. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that there exists a trade-off relation between key EBP epistemic values and 
non-epistemic values that are sensitive to distributive consequences of policy, e.g. equality 
and priority for the worst-off. This trade-off obtains because the outputs afforded by 
standard EBP methods are differentially useful for the pursuit of different moral and 
political values. I have argued that this trade-off challenges ideals of value-freedom and 
neutrality in the EBP paradigm. This may be taken as starting point to reconsider some of 
the standard epistemic value presuppositions entertained in EBP as well as for refining 
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EBP methodology in ways that enable and facilitate the pursuit of a wider range of moral 
and political values.  
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